Verifying PULPino RISCY Core for a Google Accelerator with STING

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Abstract—Google uses the PULPino RISC-V core RISCY as a job scheduling and dispatch mechanism for a hardware accelerator (similar to a GPU controller). This requires full compliance with the RISC-V RV32I base integer instruction set, standard extensions for integer multiplication and division (‘M’) and compressed instructions (‘C’), and capability to handle interrupts from multiple sources. We used STING, a software-driven verification solution for RISC-V based CPU/SoC implementations, to verify the architectural compliance and functionality of the RISCY core. This verification effort helped uncover 30 RTL, documentation, and toolchain issues in the relatively mature RISCY implementation.

Keywords—RISC-V, PULPino, RISCY Core, STING, System-on-Chip, Design-Under-Test, Functional Testing, Design Verification

1. INTRODUCTION

A job scheduler configures an accelerator device, puts itself to sleep, and then awakens to service interrupt requests. Since it is only executes first party code, any instruction set that has a robust toolchain can be used. RISC-V is an attractive option, but available open source implementations have not been used in as many designs as their commercial counterparts and have not, in general, been subjected to the same level of verification. This paper describes one attempt to bridge this verification gap.

User-specific accelerator jobs are passed from the host processor through shared data structures. An ISA with integer computation is required to properly process shared job descriptors. Also, the ISA should have a compressed instruction format to minimize the memory footprint for executable storage. Full ISA compliance is necessary to utilize the latest upstreamed tool chain, in this case RV32I [4]. The core will have access to full system memory that will contain executable firmware in addition to accelerator configuration data. Full interrupt capability at the machine privilege level is needed to pass notification from the accelerator to the core of timely status changes. This paper describes the comprehensive verification flow setup using STING [7] in order to test this functionality.

The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 and 3 present an overview of the PULPino platform and STING design verification tool respectively. Section 4 describes the steps we took to bring up the tool and
verify the core. Sections 5 and 6 discuss the results in terms of coverage and the functional issues found in
the design, and Section 7 summarizes the paper and concludes.

2. Overview Of PULPino Platform and RISCY Core

PULPino [2] is an open-source, single-core microcontroller system, based on PULP platform [1] developed
by teams from ETH Zurich, Switzerland and University of Bologna, Italy. It implements several ideas
developed through research on ultra-low power parallel processing, and has a rich set of peripherals and full
debug support. PULPino can be configured to use different 32-bit RISC-V core configurations depending on
the application use-case.

The core configuration Google uses, RISCY [3], is a highly power efficient, 4-stage, in-order, single-issue,
32-bit RISC-V core designed for DSP applications. The core has complete support for the RV32I base
integer instruction set and extensions for compressed and integer multiplication/division instructions. It also
implements several other custom extensions such as hardware loops, post-incrementing load and store
instructions, bit manipulation instructions and MAC operations.

![Figure 1: Block diagram of RISCY core](image)

RISCY includes a small subset of the privileged specification and CSRs (control and status registers), which
keeps the footprint of the core small while allowing embedded operating systems such as FreeRTOS to run.
The design is available for RTL simulation and FPGA mapping and has been taped out in an ASIC before.

The PULPino SoC also supports a number of peripherals, including Timer, Event Unit and UART, which
were used in STING to test the scenarios requiring external interrupts.
STING is a proprietary design verification tool for RISC-V based implementations developed by Valtrix Technologies Private Limited, India. STING is a light-weight software program (similar to an embedded operating system) which can be used to generate and execute different workloads (directed, algorithmic or random) on the device-under-test (DUT) for verifying architectural compliance and functional testing [7]. It embodies a software driven test generation methodology which allows portability of test stimulus throughout the life cycle of a SoC design.

The hardware resource utilization and instruction and memory footprint of the test can also be easily controlled using configurable parameters, making it easy to target any SoC configuration from IoT microcontrollers to multi-core servers.

Figure 2 shows the different components of the software stack of STING. It consists of test generators, checkers, device drivers, verification libraries/APIs and a microkernel. These are built into a bare metal ELF image which can be booted seamlessly on the DUT in any verification environment, such as in simulations, in-circuit emulation, FPGA prototype and silicon. The user can control the generation of intelligent, self-checking, and architecturally correct test sequences in the portable test program using intuitive test configurations. After it is booted, the program can run tests targeting a specific SoC/CPU feature and report any anomalies detected during execution.

In addition to the random tests, STING also supports programming frameworks and mechanisms to cover different test stimulus generation methodologies.

Directed tests (for scenarios like Mutual Exclusion, Cross Modifying Code, Memory Ordering, etc.) can be developed using a programming framework which allows users to write stimulus in an assembly language like syntax. This framework forms the foundation of the architectural compliance tests in the RISC-V verification suite in STING. For tests which require complex programming constructs (such as CRC calculation, Fast Fourier Transform, etc.), or which are algorithmic in nature (such as Level 3 Cache Collision), STING provides a C++ based programming framework to develop stimulus in high-level code. Abstractions on top of this framework have been created to enable development of drivers for peripheral devices in an SoC. Snippets of code from the OS, applications, and benchmarks can also be ported to STING easily using the C++ based framework.
New tests and feature enhancements were added to STING in order to cover the scenarios identified in the test plan for the PULPino RISCY core. The next section describes the different tasks undertaken during the project execution in detail.

4. Tasks For Verification Of PULPino RISCY Core

The verification of the RISCY core was verified by running STING tests on the PULPino platform testbench. The PULP software tool chain was used for the build environment of STING to compile the source code into an ELF/executable, which was then loaded into the testbench and run on the DUT.

The RISCY core verification project was divided into multiple phases which have been described in detail in the sections given below.

A. Preliminary Enabling – Tool Bringup, Test-bench Changes

The default memory map of PULPino has 32kB of non-contiguous instruction and data RAM [2]. Since a small-sized memory limits the number of test instructions and size of memory buffers in STING, we changed the configuration parameters in PULPino top level SystemVerilog file to create a single unified 2MB RAM, with the boot ROM relocated to a high memory address. Every STING image for PULPino is run on SPIKE, a RISC-V functional simulator, to get the reference test results for checking. In order to match the program counter and memory buffer used for the reference run on SPIKE, the boot address was changed to a different value in the testbench.

These changes enabled simple STING tests to boot and execute on the PULPino test bench.

B. Test Plan

We leveraged an existing RISC-V CPU test plan [6] for the RV32I base integer instruction set and extensions for the compressed and integer multiplication/division instructions. We added an addendum for PULPino specific features such as the custom instruction extensions and the privilege level architecture.

C. Tool and Test Stimulus Enhancements

Since the RISCY core implements only a small part of the RISC-V privilege specification [5], we modified the kernel in STING to enable execution of tests on the PULPino test bench. We also made changes to account for the difference in the bit-fields of control and status registers and interrupt vector table (IVT).

One key functionality to be verified was asynchronous interrupts to the core. We added device drivers for the event unit, timers, and UART to enable asynchronous interrupt delivery. On the test stimulus side, we added new configurations to the test database to ensure that all the hardware features identified in the test plan were covered. We also developed cross product tests that exercise the interaction between the instruction execution and events/interrupts.
**D. Execution Phase - Readiness, Volume Regression, Debug**

Once the tool and test stimulus development milestones were reached, we began volume regressions. Each test had a priority assigned in the hardware regression plan which determined the frequency at which it was selected in the regressions.

The failures from regression went through the first level of debug at Valtrix. If the failure trended towards being a logic bug, it was escalated to the design team at Google for further debug. The Google design team then worked with the PULP team at ETH to devise a fix and upstream it to the open source repository. In case a RTL fix was made, it was verified with extensive regressions of the test configuration which resulted in the original failure.

**E. Coverage tasks**

Measuring coverage is a crucial task in achieving verification sign-off. STING coverage manager is an utility which extracts information about different architectural events from the test files and execution logs and populates a database. The database can then be queried to determine if a particular scenario from the test plan is getting covered or not. For PULPino, we enhanced the coverage manager to process the core trace file generated by the test bench and developed queries to assess the overall test plan coverage. We also generated code coverage to find if there were any missing holes in the stimulus.

5. **Coverage Results**

We developed a large number of queries for the database created by STING coverage manager to check if the scenarios defined in the test plan are getting covered or not. We analyzed the results to adjust the test stimulus and fix gaps in the test plan coverage. For example, the initial rounds of analysis revealed a poor coverage of scenarios involving `ecall` instruction in the test, which was then fixed for the future regressions. We have been continuously monitoring the coverage results and tweaking the test stimulus and regression plan to achieve test plan completion.

The code coverage analysis has also yielded some interesting results. We have found that the STING tests have covered most of the core functionality. The code coverage numbers for the RISCY core from the regressions are given in the table below -

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Block</th>
<th>Expression</th>
<th>Toggle</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Transition</th>
<th>Assertion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>94.14%</td>
<td>89.55%</td>
<td>98.41%</td>
<td>83.87%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1: Code coverage results from STING regressions*

The uncovered areas were mostly in PULP specific extensions (including hardware loops, bit manipulation, vector operations, MAC) and features of sleep control, floating point unit, debug unit, performance counters and illegal instructions, which were not in the scope of the verification as the use cases for these features did not exist. The remaining holes are being addressed by adding more STING based tests to achieve coverage. The new tests added to close coverage goals have also helped in discovering new bugs.
A number of design issues were found in the RISCY core by running STING tests on the PULPino test-bench. The high level details of the bugs have been summarized in the table given below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Root Cause</th>
<th>Fix Classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Binding between timer interrupts and event unit lines is different from what is documented</td>
<td>Documentation Bug</td>
<td>Documentation/Errata Fix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Documentation issue with lp.setupi instruction</td>
<td>Documentation Bug</td>
<td>Documentation/Errata Fix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Illegal instruction exception with fence and fence.i instructions</td>
<td>Logic Bug</td>
<td>Documentation/Errata Fix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Invalid memory access exception not generated for memory accesses to non-existent memory</td>
<td>Logic Bug</td>
<td>Documentation/Errata Fix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Core execution hangs after a directed test sequence which access invalid memory addresses</td>
<td>Logic Bug</td>
<td>Documentation/Errata Fix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Destination register value miscompare with mulhsu instruction</td>
<td>Logic Bug</td>
<td>RTL Fix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Hardware loop counter does not decrement if loop end boundary spans across an uncompressed instruction</td>
<td>Logic Bug</td>
<td>Documentation/Errata Fix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Unexpected mepc csr read return value from csrrwi instruction</td>
<td>Logic Bug</td>
<td>RTL Fix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Execution hang with hardware loops and timer interrupts</td>
<td>Logic Bug</td>
<td>RTL Fix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Instructions in the branch shadow of bge getting executed</td>
<td>Logic Bug</td>
<td>RTL Fix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Writes to RO CSR mhartid using csrsr does not generate illegal instruction exception</td>
<td>Logic Bug</td>
<td>Documentation/Errata Fix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Low bit of CSR mepc is not set to 0</td>
<td>Logic Bug</td>
<td>Documentation/Errata Fix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Data from load bypassing a CSR read and incorrectly forwarded to store</td>
<td>Logic Bug</td>
<td>RTL Fix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Unexpected loop exits if interrupts arrive at the last instruction of the hardware loop</td>
<td>Logic Bug</td>
<td>Documentation/Errata Fix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Access to non-existent CSR does not generate illegal instruction exception</td>
<td>Logic Bug</td>
<td>Documentation/Errata Fix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Possible tracer issue when lw tries to read its own instruction memory</td>
<td>Logic Bug</td>
<td>Documentation/Errata Fix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Unpredictable behavior on code execution from invalid memory</td>
<td>Logic Bug</td>
<td>Documentation/Errata Fix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>RV64 instruction lwu is getting detected as p.elw in PULPino instead of generating illegal exception</td>
<td>Logic Bug</td>
<td>Documentation/Errata Fix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Unexpected illegal instruction exception with HINT forms of compressed instructions</td>
<td>Logic Bug</td>
<td>Documentation/Errata Fix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Reserved instruction form CJR (rs1=0) does not generate illegal instruction exception</td>
<td>Logic Bug</td>
<td>Documentation/Errata Fix</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: List of issues found in verification of PULPino RISCY core

Logic bugs in the design which were critical for the use case were fixed in the RTL, while the others were reported in internally published documentation/errata. A number of issues were found in the software toolchain and PULPino documentation as well. The distribution of the bugs according to the failure root cause and the fix classification are given in Figure 3 and Figure 4 below.

Figure 3: Distribution of bugs according to failure root cause

Figure 4: Distribution of bugs according to fix classification
During early verification we found some critical issues in the implementation of hardware loops (check subsection C below for details). We removed hardware loops from scope of verification because there was risk of closing the bugs in time and we had limited performance gains from this feature in our usage model. We restricted the toolchain not to use them in the current implementation.

Some of the interesting logic bugs found in the RISCY core have been described in the sections given below.

A. Destination register value miscompare with mulhsu instruction

This issue was reported from the value sweeping test for mulhsu instruction. The test picks random input values and compares the results from the execution of the instruction on DUT and a functionally accurate simulator (SPIKE in this case).

RISCY implements the multiplier as a multi-cycle operation which involves cross multiplication of 16-bit operands. A problem would arise in the third multiply cycle, where one of the operands was getting incorrectly interpreted as a signed negative value, if the MSB of both the operands were set. The implementation was fixed to address the corner case condition.

B. Data from load bypassing a CSR read and incorrectly forwarded to store

This issue was found by a pipeline test which exercises the register write-after-write (WAW) dependency between a load and CSR read instruction. In case of this failure, the data read by load was bypassing the CSR read instruction and getting forwarded to a later store.

In this case, the core was not being stalled on a load to an ALU register causing the incorrect value to be stored. The stall mechanism was updated to fix the issue.

C. Unexpected loop exits if interrupts arrive at the last instruction of the hardware loop

This issue was a result of interaction between instructions inside a hardware loop and asynchronous timer interrupts. It was observed that the execution was coming out of the loop in case the timer interrupt arrived at the last instruction of the loop.

This bug comes when an interrupt arrives in the middle of hardware loop execution and the mret restores the last instruction of the loop. If that instruction is misaligned, only the first part of the instruction is correctly fetched before the hardware loop jumps to the first instruction of the loop. The RTL fix for this issue is being currently investigated.

D. Performance bubbles introduced in the pipeline when taken branch followed by DIV/REM instructions

This issue was found on reviewing the coverage results accumulated from the regression tests by the STING coverage manager. It was found in few cases that the compressed conditional branch instructions were taking a large number of cycles to execute.
In this case, we observed that the multiplier remains enabled while branch is taken causing a second execution of the DIV/REM. This is a performance issue and has not been addressed in the implementation yet.

7. CONCLUSION

STING has been successfully used for the functional verification of PULPino RISCY core. The coverage results and the list of design issues from running STING tests on the PULPino test bench has been presented in the previous sections. We hope that the verification flow established by this work will be reused for future RISC-V based implementations.

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REFERENCES


